

Al-Taftazani's (792 AH) Contributions in His Commentary on *Miftāḥ al-ʿUlūm*: Coordination and Disjunction as Matters of Choice

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The topics of coordination (*waḥḥ*) and disjunction (*faḥḥ*) are among the most intricate subjects in the science of *Maʿānī* (semantics and rhetoric), as they address the principles governing whether sentences should be linked together or separated according to the context requirement. This subject attracted the attention of rhetoricians as (ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī), followed by (al-Sakkākī) and (al-Qazwīnī), and later (al-Taftazani), who is considered the most prominent scholar of the commentary tradition. The present study examines his contribution to the discussion of coordination and disjunction in his commentary on *Miftāḥ al-ʿUlūm*.

First: The Concept of Disjunction and Coordination

Linguistically, *faḥḥ* (disjunction) is defined in *Al-ʿAyn* as: “*Faḥḥ* denotes the separation between two things. In the body, *faḥḥ* refers to the place of articulation or joint, and between every two separations there is a connection (*waḥḥ*). *Faḥḥ* also signifies judgment between truth and falsehood, and such a judgment is called a *fayḥ*.”⁽¹⁾

As for *waḥḥ* (coordination or connection), *Al-Muḥkam* defines it as: “*Waḥḥ* is the opposite of *faḥḥ*. One connects a thing to another by means of *waḥḥ* (connection).”⁽²⁾ Likewise, *Lisān al-ʿArab* states: “I connected one thing to another by means of *waḥḥ* and *ilah*; and *waḥḥ* is the opposite of separation and estrangement.”⁽³⁾

Terminologically, *faḥḥ* refers to “the omission of conjunctions when linking certain sentences to others.”⁽⁴⁾ *Waḥḥ*, on the other hand, is “the coordination of one sentence with another.”⁽⁵⁾

Second: Coordination and Disjunction in the Works of Rhetoricians

References to coordination and disjunction can be found in the writings of early rhetoricians before (ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī). This is evident, for example, in the work of (al-Jāḥi) (255 AH) during his discussion of eloquence, where he states: “A Persian was asked, ‘What is eloquence?’ He replied, ‘The knowledge of when to separate and when to connect speech.’”⁽⁶⁾

Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskar also addressed the subject, devoted considerable attention, and cited numerous statements emphasizing the importance of this rhetorical technique. Among these statements is the remark attributed to (Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Saffā), who said to his secretary: “Observe the divisions and boundaries of speech and beware of mixing what is orderly with what is neglected. Among the ornaments of eloquence is the knowledge of the proper places for disjunction and coordination.”⁽⁷⁾

¹ Al-Ayn Dictionary, entry (*faḥḥ*): 3/324.

² Al-Muḥkam wa al-Muḥīt al-ʿAḥḥam: 8/374.

³ Lisān al-ʿArab: 15/316.

⁴ Al-Taʿrīfāt: 140.

⁵ Al-Taʿrīfāt: 211.

⁶ Al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn: 1/88.

⁷ Al-Sināʿatayn: 458, and see: Al-Balāghah wa al-Tatbīq: 152-153.

Al-ʿ Askarī further examined matters concerning the divisions and transitions in poetic composition. However, the first scholar to investigate coordination and disjunction with a significant degree of precision and detail was (ʿ Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī), who devoted a separate chapter to the subject in *Dalāʾ il al-lʿ jāz*. He begins by explaining the importance of disjunction (*fa*□/l) and coordination (*wa*□/l) and linking them to the chapter on conjunction, stating:

“knowledge of what ought to be done with sentences in terms of coordinating some with others, or leaving coordination aside and presenting them separately, with each sentence being initiated after the other, is among the secrets of eloquence and among those matters in which complete correctness cannot be attained except by those who are pure masters of the language... The matter has reached such a degree of importance that they made it a criterion of eloquence... This is due to its delicacy of method, and because no one can attain excellence unless attaining excellence in the other meanings of eloquence as well.” (1)

ʿ Abd al-Qāhir argues that coordinated sentences are of two types. The first is where the sentence to which another is coordinated occupies a grammatical position (*maw*□/l *min al-iʿ rāb*), in which case it is treated as a single word. The coordination of the second sentence with it proceeds in the same manner as the coordination of one word with another, through sharing the same grammatical inflection and ruling. An example is: *Marartu bi-rajulin khalquhu □asanun wa khuluquhu qabī□un* (“I passed by a man whose appearance is good and whose character is bad”). The second sentence is in the genitive position because it functions as an adjective qualifying an indefinite noun. This type presents no difficulty.

The second type involves coordinating a sentence with another that has no grammatical position, as in: *Zaydun qāʾ imun wa ʿ Amrun qāʾ idun* (“Zayd is standing and ʿ Amr is sitting”). Here, the second coordinated sentence does not share any grammatical inflection with the first. However, it is necessary to understand the purpose of the coordination. From his discussion, it can be understood that the conjunction *wāw* (and) is not used here for grammatical association, since the first sentence has no grammatical position, and the same applies to the second sentence coordinated with it. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the rhetorical purposes underlying the presence or omission of coordination. (2)

The particle *wāw* is specifically associated with this issue, unlike the other conjunction particles, because those particles convey additional meanings besides association, whereas *wāw* has no meaning other than association in the grammatical ruling that requires the second element to follow the first in inflection. (3)

ʿ Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī summarized the cases of disjunction (*fa*□/l) and coordination (*wa*□/l) by classifying sentences into three categories. He states:

“A sentence whose relation to the one preceding it is like that of an adjective to the noun it qualifies, or of an emphatic expression to that which it emphasizes; in such a case, coordination is never appropriate, because coordinating it would resemble the coordination of a thing with itself. A sentence relating to the preceding one is like that of one noun to another distinct noun yet sharing with it a grammatical ruling and entering with it into a common meaning, such as when both nouns are subjects, objects, or genitive complements; in this case, coordination is required. And a sentence that belongs to neither of these two categories, but whose relation to the preceding sentence is like that of one noun to another that shares nothing with it... where the mention or omission of the preceding element is of equal consequence to its state... In this case, coordination should be omitted altogether. Thus, the omission of coordination occurs either because of the utmost degree of connection or the utmost degree of separation. In contrast, coordination applies to what occupies an intermediate position between the two.” (4)

¹ *Dalāʾ il al-lʿ jāz*: 222.

² See: *Dalāʾ il al-lʿ jāz*: 223-224, and: Issues of Separation and Connection between al-Jurjani and al-Sakkaki (Research): 8.

³ See: *Dalāʾ il al-lʿ jāz*: 224, and The Semantic Lesson of ʿAbd al-Qahir al-Jurjani: 261.

⁴ *Dalāʾ il al-lʿ jāz*: 243

Al-Jurjānī, therefore, argues that the omission of coordination between two sentences and the separation of one from the other occur either because of the highest degree of connection or the highest degree of separation. Coordination and connection, on the other hand, apply to what stands midway between these two extremes. ⁽¹⁾

As for al-Sakkākī, he placed the discussion of disjunction (*fa□/*) and coordination (*wa□/*) within the topics of declarative speech (*khābar*), making it the final branch among its categories. In his treatment of the subject, he was clearly influenced by ' Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī. He explained the concept of disjunction and coordination while emphasizing its importance in the attainment of eloquence, stating:

"It is the omission of the conjunction and its use in these respective situations... It is indeed the touchstone of eloquence, the test of insight, the arena of critical examination, the field in which perceptions vary in excellence, and the measure of the depth of understanding..." ⁽²⁾.

Al-Sakkākī further explained that coordination constitutes the foundation of this discipline and noted that it is of two kinds: "One type is relatively easy to employ, while the other is more difficult. The easier type is when coordination is intended either by means of a conjunction other than *wāw*, or by means of *wāw*, provided that the sentence coordinated possesses a grammatical position. The more difficult type is when coordination is intended through *wāw*, while the sentence coordinated to has no grammatical position. The reason why the former is easier and the latter more difficult is that coordination in rhetoric depends upon knowledge of three principles: first, the position in which it is appropriate by convention; second, its benefit; and third, the reason why it is acceptable rather than rejected." ⁽³⁾.

This classification appears to have been adopted from ' Abd al-Qāhir, with only minor additions. These additions are reflected in his statement: "There are only two categories of grammatical inflection (*i' rāb*): one that is independent and one that is dependent. Once it is established that the second category is confined to the five types of dependence—substitution (*badal*), attribution (*wa□/*), explicative apposition (*bayān*), emphasis (*ta' kīd*), and the following of one element after another in inflection through the mediation of a particle... then the first category is not a suitable locus for coordination by any conjunction particle, since one of the essential conditions of coordination is absent, namely, the prior existence of that which is followed." ⁽⁴⁾.

Al-Sakkākī's discussion does not depart significantly from what ' Abd al-Qāhir had stated regarding the three categories of sentences, except in certain particulars, such as differences in examples or wording. He defined the situations of disjunction and coordination as follows:

"Whenever a sentence occupies, in the speaker's discourse, the position of a sentence standing independently from any sentence coordinated with it—such as when it is intended to be disconnected from what precedes it, or when it is intended as a substitute for a preceding sentence—it is not a case in which the conjunction *and* should be introduced. Likewise, whenever it stands in relation to the preceding sentence as though it were part of it, owing to the completeness of their connection, such as when it serves to clarify, explain, confirm, or reinforce it, it is not a case in which the conjunction should be introduced. Similarly, whenever there is no unifying relationship between it and the preceding sentence because of their complete separation, it is likewise not a case in which the conjunction *and* should be introduced. Rather, the conjunction *and* is appropriately introduced only when the sentence occupies an intermediate position between complete connection and complete separation, and each of these categories has a condition that necessitates it..." ⁽⁵⁾.

Al-Sakkākī explains these situations. Among them is disjunction, and he clarified that the condition requiring disjunction is of two types. The first is when the preceding statement carries a particular ruling, and the speaker

¹ See: Rhetoric, development and history: 179.

² Miftah Al-Ulum: 249.

³ Miftah Al-Ulum: 249.

⁴ Miftah Al-Ulum: 2.50

⁵ Miftah Al-Ulum: 252, and see Al-Balagha at Al-Sakaki: 218.

does not intend for the second statement to share in that ruling; in such a case, disjunction is employed. This disjunction may occur either as a matter of precaution or as a matter of necessity. The second is when the preceding statement, by implication, functions as though it were prompting a question; this implied question is then treated as if it were posed. The first type is called *disjunction*, while the second is termed *resumption* (*isti' nāf*).

As for the condition requiring substitution, it arises when the preceding statement does not fully convey the intended meaning, or is treated as though it does not, and the context is such that further elaboration is warranted, either because the matter is sought after, unusual, alarming, astonishing, or subtle.

The condition requiring clarification and explanation occurs when the preceding statement contains a degree of ambiguity and the context calls for its removal.

The condition requiring complete separation exists when the two statements differ in that one is declarative, and the other is imperative, or, if both are declarative, when there is no connecting relationship between them in terms of reason, supposition, or imagination.

The condition requiring an intermediate position arises when the two statements differ as declarative and imperative, yet the context contains elements that remove this difference and establish common links between them through unifying relationships. ⁽¹⁾

Al-Sakkākī further noted that one of the rhetorical merits of coordination is the correspondence between the two sentences in being either nominal or verbal, in a manner appropriate to the context. He supported this view with textual evidence, including the Qur'anic verse:

"And if you invite them to guidance, they will not follow you. It is the same for you whether you call them, or you are silent."

The meaning is: it is all the same to you whether you call them to guidance or remain silent and refrain from calling them, for whenever they were afflicted by hardship, they would invoke God rather than their idols. ⁽²⁾

As for al-Qazwīnī, he began his discussion of disjunction (*fa□l*) and coordination (*wa□l*) by defining them and restricting their application to sentences. He stated: "Coordination is the conjunction of some sentences with others, while disjunction is the omission of such conjunction." ⁽³⁾

Al-Qazwīnī followed al-Sakkākī and al-Jurjānī in emphasizing the importance and difficulty of disjunction and coordination, regarding them as among the highest levels of eloquence. He likewise adopted their view that coordination by means of *wāw* occurs either between a sentence that has a grammatical position or between sentences in which such a position is at issue. He explained that the purpose of coordinating sentences is to make the second sentence share in the grammatical ruling of the first. This can only occur when the sentence possesses a grammatical position, and a sentence acquires such a position only when it functions in the place of a single word. He further maintained that there must be a unifying relationship between the two sentences, just as there must be between individual words. An example of this is the Qur'anic verse:

And Allah withholds and grants abundance, and to Him you will be⁽⁴⁾

However, when coordination is affected by a conjunction other than *wāw*, and the intention is to indicate the relationship of the second sentence to the first according to the meaning conveyed by that conjunction, the sentence is coordinated by means of that particle. Thus, one may say: "*Zayd entered, then ' Amr departed*"

¹ See: Miftah al-Ulum: 252, 253, and 258.

² Surah Al-A'raf: Verse: 193.

³ See: Miftah al-Ulum: 271, and Issues of Separation and Connection between al-Jurjani and al-Sakaki: 21.

⁴ Summary : 59.

(*dakhala Zaydun fa-kharaja ʿ Amrun*), when the intention is to indicate that ʿ Amr's departure occurred immediately after Zayd's entry, without any interval between the two events. ⁽¹⁾

Al-Qazwīnī briefly identified four situations in which disjunction is required. The first occurs when there is no intention to assign the second sentence the same ruling as the first. In such a case, disjunction becomes necessary, as in the Qur'anic verse:

"And when they meet those who believe, they say, 'We believe'; but when they are alone with their devils, they say, 'Indeed, we are with you; we were only mocking.'" ⁽²⁾

Disjunction is likewise required when there is complete separation between the two sentences and such separation does not create ambiguity contrary to the intended meaning; when there is complete connection between them; when the second sentence occupies the position of one detached from the first; or when it occupies the position of one closely connected to it. ⁽³⁾

Al-Qazwīnī then elaborated on each of these situations. He explained that complete separation may relate either to the predication itself or to its two elements and occur in two cases. The first is when the two sentences differ as declarative and non-declarative statements, both in wording and meaning, as in the examples: "Do not approach the lion; it will devour you," and "Will you do such-and-such for me? I shall pay you the fee," with the second clause in each case remaining in the indicative form. It may also occur when the difference is one of meaning rather than wording, as in the expression: "So-and-so has died—may God have mercy upon him." The second case is when there is no unifying relationship between the two sentences. ⁽⁴⁾

As for complete connection, it arises for three reasons. The first is when the second sentence serves as confirmation of the first. The purpose of such confirmation is to remove any suspicion of figurative interpretation or error. This takes two forms. The first is when the second sentence stands in relation to the first as semantic emphasis stands to that which it emphasizes, strengthening the assertion despite a difference in meaning, as in the verse:

"Alif, Lām, Mīm. This is the Book in which there is no doubt." ⁽⁵⁾

The second form is when the second sentence stands in relation to the first as verbal emphasis stands to that which it emphasizes, with both conveying the same meaning, as in the verse:

"This is the Book in which there is no doubt, a guidance for the God-conscious." ⁽⁶⁾

The second reason for complete connection is when the second sentence functions as a substitute for the first. The motive for substitution is that the first sentence does not fully convey the intended meaning, whereas the second does. The context further requires particular attention to the matter for a rhetorical purpose, whether because it is desirable, alarming, astonishing, or subtle. This category has two forms: the first is when the second sentence stands in relation to the first as a partial substitute stands to its antecedent; the second is when the second sentence stands in relation to the first as a substitute of inclusion stands to its antecedent.

¹ Surah Al-Baqarah: Verse: 245.

² Al-Idāḥ: 119.

³ See: Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ: 60, and Al-Idāḥ: 120.

⁴ See: Al-Idāḥ: 120–121.

⁵ Qur'an, Surah al-Baqarah: verse 14.

⁶ Qur'an, Surah al-Baqarah: verse 2.

The third reason is when the second sentence serves as an explanation of the first. In this case, it occupies the position of an explanatory apposition, providing clarification. The need for explanation arises when the first sentence contains some ambiguity, and the context calls for its removal, as in the verse:

“Then Satan whispered to him, saying, ‘O Adam, shall I direct you to the Tree of Eternity and to a kingdom that never decays?’” (1) (2).

Al-Qazwini explained that *fasl* (disjunction) occurs when the second sentence is treated as detached from the first, because coordinating it with the first might create the false impression that it is coordinated with another sentence. He divided *fasl* into two categories: **precautionary disjunction**, where no actual impediment to coordination exists, and **obligatory disjunction**, where coordination is prevented by a specific impediment. When the second sentence is regarded as closely connected to the first, it serves as an answer to a question implied by the preceding sentence. In such instances, the second sentence assumes the status of that implied answer and is therefore separated from the first, just as an answer is separated from a question (3).

As for *wasl* (conjunction), it occurs in an intermediate state between complete disjunction and complete connection. It is of two types: first, where the two statements are both declarative or both non-declaratives, agreeing in both form and meaning; and second, where they agree in meaning but not in form. In both cases, the unifying relationship must concern both the subjects and the predicates, as in the example: “Zayd perceives, writes, gives, and withholds.” The link between the two sentences may be rational, imaginative, or illusory. Regarding the rhetorical embellishments of *wasl*, Al-Qazwini adopted the same treatment found in Al-Sakkaki, namely the correspondence between the two sentences in being either verbal or nominal constructions (4).

Third: Al-Taftazani's View in *Al-Mutawwal* and *Al-Mukhtasar*

In both *Al-Mutawwal* and *Al-Mukhtasar*, Al-Taftazani was content to adopt Al-Qazwini's definition of *fasl* and *wasl* without introducing any substantial additions. He did, however, explain why Al-Qazwini discussed *wasl* before *fasl*, arguing that the relationship between them is analogous to that between privation and possession (‘*adam* and *malakah*), and that privations are understood through their corresponding positive attributes. By contrast, at the beginning of the book, Al-Qazwini discussed *fasl* first because it is the original state, whereas *wasl* is secondary and arises from it. Al-Taftazani also justified Al-Qazwini's use of the term *sentence* (*jumlaḥ*) rather than *speech* (*kalam*), noting that the former is broader in scope. *Kalam* refers to an expression containing a primary predication and intended for its own sake, whereas *jumlaḥ* refers to any expression containing a primary predication, whether it is independently intended (5).

Al-Taftazani identified the situations in which *fasl* and *wasl* apply as follows: “The first is complete disjunction without ambiguity; the second, complete connection; the third, quasi-complete disjunction; the fourth, quasi-complete connection; the fifth, complete disjunction accompanied by ambiguity; and the sixth, an intermediate state between the two extremes. The ruling for the last two is conjunction (*wasl*), while the ruling for the preceding four is disjunction (*fasl*). In the first and third cases, this is due to the absence of an appropriate relationship; in the second and fourth, it is due to the absence of the distinction that would require connection through a coordinating particle” (6).

What is meant by the condition that “the first statement should not possess a ruling that is not intended to be attributed to the second” is that the first statement should either have no ruling beyond the meaning conveyed by the sentence itself, or, if it does possess such an additional ruling, that ruling must likewise be intended for

¹ Qur'an, Surah Tāhā: verse 120.

² See: Bughyat al-Idāḥ: 2/62–66.

³ See: Al-Idāḥ: 123–124.

⁴ See: Al-Idāḥ: 127, and see: Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ: 66.

⁵ See: Al-Muṭawwal: 2/263.

⁶ Al-Muṭawwal: 2/278.

the second statement. Al-Taftazani therefore confined the first four situations to *fasl* (disjunction), because *wasl* (conjunction) requires both distinction and correspondence.

Since conjunction presupposes distinction, it is incompatible with complete connection or quasi-complete connection. If the two statements were joined by the conjunction *wa* ("and"), a contradiction would arise between the correspondence implied by the conjunction and the complete or quasi-complete connection existing between the two statements, making the construction analogous to coordinating a thing with itself. Likewise, because a conjunction presupposes correspondence, it is incompatible with complete disjunction or quasi-complete disjunction, where no such correspondence exists. Thus, if the conjunction *wa* were employed, a contradiction would arise between the correspondence required by the conjunction and the complete or quasi-complete disjunction existing between the two statements (¹).

Al-Taftazani discusses these six situations in detail, following Al-Qazwini's classification and clarifying his intended meaning in each case. He began with *fasl* arising from complete disjunction, explaining that complete disjunction occurs when the two statements differ as declarative and non-declarative expressions, both in form and meaning; that is, when one statement is declarative in both wording and meaning, while the other is non-declarative in both wording and meaning, as in the following example (²):

"Their guide said: 'Cast anchor; we shall engage them,'
For every man's fate proceeds according to destiny."

The phrase "*we shall engage them*" (*nuzāwiluhā*) is not coordinated with "*cast anchor*" (*arsū*), because the former is declarative in both form and meaning, whereas the latter is non-declarative (imperative) in both form and meaning. This exemplifies complete disjunction (*kamāl al-inqilāb*) between the two sentences due to their difference as declarative and non-declarative expressions in both wording and meaning. Complete disjunction may also arise from a difference in meaning alone, where one statement is declarative in meaning and the other non-declarative in meaning, even though both are grammatically expressed as either declarative or non-declarative forms. An example is: "*So-and-so has died; may God have mercy on him.*" The phrase "*may God have mercy on him*" is not coordinated with "*has died*" because it is non-declarative in meaning (a supplication), whereas "*has died*" is declarative in meaning, even though both expressions are grammatically declarative in form (³).

Regarding *fasl* based on complete connection (*kamāl al-ittiḥād*), Al-Taftazani explained why Al-Qazwini did not include the case in which the second sentence functions as an adjective (*naṣṭ*) of the first. He states:

"As for the adjective, it differs from the explicative apposition (*ḥaṣṭ al-bayān*) only in that it indicates one of the attributes of the noun it modifies, whereas the latter points directly to the noun itself. Since such a relationship cannot be established between sentences, the second sentence is not regarded as bearing the same relation to the first that an adjective bears to the noun it modifies" (⁴).

In other words, regardless of its type—whether restrictive, explanatory, emphatic, or otherwise—an adjective must indicate one of the qualities or states of the noun it modifies. Since an entire sentence is incapable of performing this function, the second sentence cannot be treated as an adjective modifying the first. Furthermore, in the case of single-word constructions, the distinction between an adjective and an explicative apposition rests solely upon this characteristic.⁽⁵⁾

¹ See: Al-Mukhtaṣar: 392, and see: Ḥāshiyat al-Dasūqī 'alā al-Mukhtaṣar: 2/472.

² It is reported that Sībawayh attributed it to al-Akhtal, but it is not found in his *Dīwān*; see: Ma'āhid al-Tanṣīṣ 'alā Shawāhid al-Talkhīṣ: 271.

³ See: Al-Mukhtaṣar: 394, and Al-Muṭawwal: 2/279.

⁴ Al-Muṭawwal: 2/283.

⁵ See: Ḥāshiyat al-Siyālkūfī: 379.

As for the second category of complete connection, namely where the second sentence functions as a substitute (*badal*) for the first, Al-Taftazani expanded upon Al-Qazwini's explanation, stating:

"The second sentence is treated in relation to the first as a partial substitute (*badal al-ba' 'al*) or a substitute of inclusion (*badal al-ishtimāl*) in relation to its antecedent. Therefore, it is not coordinated with it because of the complete connection that exists between the substitute and the substitute element. Total substitution (*badal al-kull*) is not considered here, because it differs from emphasis (*tawkīd*) only in that its wording is different from that of the antecedent and that it, rather than the antecedent, is the intended element of predication. This distinction cannot be realized in sentences, particularly in those that have no syntactic position in grammatical analysis" (1).

The third category of complete connection (*kamāl al-ittiḥād*) was explained by Al-Taftazani as occurring when the second sentence serves as an elucidation (*bayān*) of the first because the meaning of the first is not immediately clear. An example is the Qur'anic verse:

"Then Satan whispered to him; he said, 'O Adam, shall I guide you to the Tree of Eternity and a kingdom that never decays?'" (2)

Here, the phrase "He said, 'O Adam...'" is regarded as an explanatory statement clarifying the meaning of "Then Satan whispered to him" (3).

Al-Taftazani further noted that *fasl* (disjunction) may also occur in the case of **quasi-complete disjunction** (*shibh kamāl al-inqīṣā' al*). This arises when the second sentence is treated as though it were detached from the first because coordinating it with the first might create the mistaken impression that it is coordinated with another element that was not intended. Al-Qazwini likened this situation to complete disjunction because it involves an impediment to coordination. However, since this impediment is external and can be removed by contextual indication, it is not classified as complete disjunction. For this reason, the separation is termed *qaṣṣ* ("disjunction"). An example is the poet's statement (4):

*Salmā imagines that I seek in her
A substitute; I see her wandering in error.*

The two clauses display an obvious relationship because of the unity of their predicates; the meaning of "I see her" (*urāhā*) is essentially "I consider her" or "I think her." Moreover, the subject of the first clause is the beloved, whereas in the second it is the lover. Nevertheless, coordination is omitted lest the second clause be understood as being coordinated with "I seek" (*abghī*), which is not the intended meaning (5).

As for **quasi-complete connection** (*shibh kamāl al-ittiḥād*), Al-Taftazani explained that it occurs when the second sentence serves as the answer to a question implied by the first sentence. The first sentence is therefore treated as though it were the question itself because it contains and necessitates that question. Consequently, the second sentence is separated from the first in the same way that an answer is separated from a question (6).

According to Al-Qazwini's view, the first sentence itself is elevated to the status of the implied question. According to Al-Sakkaki, however, what is elevated is the implied question generated by the first sentence, which is then treated as though it were an actual spoken question. Thus, under Al-Qazwini's analysis, the second sentence is

¹ Al-Muṭawwal: 2/289.

² Qur'an, Surah Ṭāhā: verse 120.

³ See: Al-Mukhtaṣar: 400–401.

⁴ The verse is of unknown authorship, as stated in Ma'āhid al-Taṣṣīṣ: 279.

⁵ See: Al-Mukhtaṣar: 402.

⁶ See: Al-Muṭawwal: 2/300, and see: Al-Mukhtaṣar: 404.

an answer to the first sentence itself, whereas according to Al-Sakkaki it is an answer to the implied question inferred from the first sentence (¹).

As for *wasl* (conjunction), it has two principal cases. Al-Taftazani explained the first case as follows:

“Conjunctions prevent ambiguity may be illustrated by the expression: ‘No, and may God support you.’ The word ‘No’ is a response to a preceding statement, as though someone had asked, ‘Is the matter so?’ and the reply was: ‘No,’ meaning ‘The matter is not so.’ This constitutes a declarative sentence. The phrase ‘May God support you’ is non-declarative in meaning because it functions as a supplication. Thus, there is complete disjunction between the two expressions. However, omitting the conjunction here would create a meaning contrary to what is intended. If one were to say: ‘No, may God support you’ without the conjunction, it might be understood as a prayer that the addressee not be supported. To prevent this misunderstanding, the conjunction *wa* (‘and’) is inserted, thereby coordinating the supplicatory non-declarative expression with the negative declarative statement indicated by the word ‘No’” (²).

The second case of *wasl* (conjunction), namely, the conjunction arising from an intermediate position between complete disjunction and complete connection, was explained by Al-Taftazani as occurring when the two sentences are alike in being either declarative or non-declarative, both in form and meaning, or in meaning alone, provided that a unifying link (*jāmi‘*) exists between them. This follows from the principle discussed earlier that, in the absence of such a link, the relationship between the two sentences would amount to complete disjunction.

Sentences that correspond in both form and meaning as declarative or non-declarative expressions fall into two categories: either both are non-declarative, or both are declarative. As for sentences that correspond only in meaning, they comprise six categories. If both are non-declarative in meaning, their grammatical forms may be: both declarative; the first declarative and the second non-declarative; or the reverse. Likewise, if both are declarative in meaning, their grammatical forms may be: both non-declarative; the first non-declarative and the second declarative; or the reverse. Altogether, these possibilities amount to eight categories (³).

According to Al-Taftazani, the unifying link (*jāmi‘*) between two sentences must be established with reference to both the subjects (*musnad ilayh*) and the predicates (*musnad*) of the sentences. For example, in the statement: “Zayd composes poetry and writes,” the connection arises from the evident affinity between poetry and writing. This applies when the subjects of predication are identical. When the subjects differ, however, a relationship must exist between them, as in: “Zayd is a poet, and Amr is a writer.” Here, a connection must be established between Zayd and Amr themselves, such as kinship, friendship, enmity, or a similar association. Moreover, one of the two must in some way relate to the other.

Al-Taftazani defined the **rational link** (*al-jāmi‘ al-‘aqlī*) as a factor by virtue of which reason requires the two sentences to be associated together in the faculty of thought. The **imagined or estimative link** (*al-jāmi‘ al-wahmī*) is a factor by virtue of which the estimative faculty (*wahm*) associates the two sentences in thought. The **imaginative link** (*al-jāmi‘ al-khayālī*) is a factor by virtue of which the faculty of imagination associates the two sentences together in the mind (⁴).

Among the rhetorical embellishments of *wasl* (conjunction), Al-Taftazani mentioned the correspondence of the two sentences in being nominal (*ismiyyah*) or verbal (*fi‘liyyah*), as well as the correspondence of two verbal sentences in the past (*muqāṭīl*) or present (*muqāṭārī*) tense, and other forms of correspondence, such as both sentences being conditional. This, however, does not apply when one sentence is intended to convey renewal or occurrence (*tajaddud*) and the other permanence or stability (*thubūt*), in which case one may say: (*Qāma Zaydun wa Amrun qā idun*) (“Zayd stood up, while Amr is sitting”). Likewise, when one sentence is intended to

¹ See: Ḥāshiyat al-Dasūqī: 2/507.

² Al-Muṭawwal: 2/318.

³ See: Al-Mukhtaṣar: 412.

⁴ See: Al-Mukhtaṣar: 415, and Al-Muṭawwal: 2/331, 335, and 340.

express the past and the other the present, one may say: (*Zaydun qāma wa ʿ Amrun yaq ʿ udu*) (“Zayd stood up and ʿ Amr is sitting”). Similarly, when one sentence is intended to be absolute and the other qualified by a condition, as in the Qur’anic verse: *Wa qālū lawlā unzila ʿ alayhi malakun wa law anzalnā malakan laquḥiya al-amr* (“They said: ‘Why has an angel not been sent down to him?’ Had We sent down an angel, the matter would have been settled”) (1).. (2).

Fourth: Al-Taftazani’s Observations in *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*

In his commentary on *Al-Miftāḥ*, Al-Taftazani explained the significance of *fasl* (disjunction) and *wasl* (conjunction), a significance that stems from the subtlety and complexity of the subject. So profound is this topic that scholars of *ʿ ilm al-ma ʿ ānī* (the science of meanings) regarded eloquence as essentially dependent upon mastery of it. Explaining the reason for this emphasis, he states:

“Eloquence has not been restricted to it—that is, to the knowledge of *fasl* and *wasl*—because eloquence is in reality confined to it alone, but rather to draw attention to the exceptional subtlety of the discipline of *fasl* and *wasl*, and to indicate that no eloquent speaker can pass beyond this profound branch of rhetoric until he has left behind him all the other subtle rhetorical difficulties. In other words, it is impossible to attain an understanding of the true nature of this discipline without first acquiring knowledge of all the preceding and subsequent rhetorical sciences...” (3).

Al-Taftazani further explained that the relationship between the meanings of two sentences falls into three categories: **identity and connection** (*kamāl al-ittiḥād*), **difference and disjunction** (*kamāl al-inqilāb*), and an **intermediate state** between the two. The principles governing *fasl* (disjunction) and *wasl* (conjunction) revolve around these categories. In the first two cases, the rule is *fasl*, whereas in the third, the rule is *wasl*. Explaining Al-Sakkaki’s statement that *fasl* and *wasl* are based upon these categories, Al-Taftazani notes that:

“Each of these categories has its own conditions, details, and impediments, as in conjunction employed to prevent ambiguity despite complete disjunction, such as: (*Lā wa ayyadaka Allāh*) (‘No, and may God support you’), or the omission of a conjunction despite an intermediate relationship because a conjunction would create a meaning contrary to what is intended. Thus, not every instance of complete connection or complete disjunction requires *fasl*, nor does every intermediate case require *wasl* ... yet these categories remain the fundamental basis upon which the matter revolves” (4).

Al-Taftazani also pointed out that the coordination of sentences is of two kinds: **readily accessible coordination** (*qarīb al-ta ʿ āḥ*) and **remote coordination** (*ba ʿ īd al-ta ʿ āḥ*). This distinction arises because the coordination of one sentence with another is either affected by the conjunction *wa* (“and”) or by another coordinating particle. In either case, the sentence to which the second is coordinated may either possess a grammatical position (*maḥall min al-i ʿ rāb*) or not. When the coordination is accomplished by a particle other than *wa*, or when it is accomplished by *wa* and the sentence being coordinated has a grammatical position, the construction is considered readily accessible and easy to comprehend. All other forms fall into the category of remote coordination (5).

Al-Taftazani explained the distinction between these two categories by observing that:

“The issue of coordination does not concern the mere correctness of grammatical structure or the conveyance of the basic meaning, for the question of why a construction is regarded as acceptable has no bearing on these

¹ Qur’an, Surah al-An’ām: verse 8.

² See: *Al-Muṭawwal*: 2/347, and *Al-Mukhtaṣar*: 426.

³ *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*, 2:187.

⁴ *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*, 2:164.

⁵ See *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*, 2:167.

matters. Rather, it concerns the judgment of whether the expression possesses eloquence and rhetorical excellence..." (1).

The Principles of Coordination

Al-Taftazani explains these three principles, which he considered indispensable for achieving coordination that conforms to the requirements of the communicative context (*muqtaḍā al-ḥāl*). He states:

"The first is the position in which coordination is appropriate from the standpoint of linguistic convention (*waḥd al-ḥāl*); that is, the assignment of a particular meaning to a coordinating particle. Thus, in coordination with *fa*, the second element must follow immediately after the first, because *fa* was established for that purpose; whereas in coordination with *thumma*, the second element must occur after a delay. The same principle applies to the remaining coordinating particles. In summary, there must exist between the coordinated element and that to which it is coordinated the meaning for which the particle was originally assigned, since nothing other than linguistic convention is relevant in this regard" (2).

In this statement, Al-Taftazani implicitly responds to Al-Kāshī, who had assumed that what was meant by *waḥd al-ḥāl* ("convention" or "assignment") was the rank or position appropriate to a given coordinating particle in relation to the other particles of coordination, in a manner consistent with the lexical meaning of the term *waḥd al-ḥāl*. Al-Kāshī states:

"The reason why the first type, which we described as readily accessible, is considered near at hand, whereas the second type, which we described as remote, is considered difficult, is that the proper use of a coordinating particle in the domain of eloquence—that is, in the position suited to it—requires knowledge of three principles. The first is the position in which the coordinating particle may appropriately occur from the standpoint of *waḥd al-ḥāl*; that is, from the standpoint of the rank that properly belongs to it in relation to other expressions" (3).

As for the second and third principles of coordination, namely **the benefit of coordination** and **the basis for its acceptability**, Al-Taftazani explained them as follows:

"The second is the benefit of coordination, namely, the knowledge that the second element is related to the first according to the relationship indicated by the coordinating particle, as previously explained, such as the elaboration of the subject (*musnad ilayh*) or the predicate (*musnad*). The third is the reason why coordination is considered acceptable, namely, that it conforms to what is appropriate in the judgment of eloquent speakers; that is, that it possesses a specific relation suited to each coordinating particle. In the case of *wa* ("and"), a unifying connection must exist between the two elements, whereas in the case of the other coordinating particles, the relationship must correspond to the specific meaning conveyed by each particle." (4).

Al-Taftazani also responded to Al-Shirāzī, who had interpreted the benefit of coordination as:

"The participation of the coordinated element and that to which it is coordinated in the meaning indicated by the grammatical inflection of the latter ... and the condition for coordination to be acceptable rather than rejected is the existence of a unifying connection between the coordinated element and that to which it is coordinated ..." (5).

Al-Taftazani objected to this interpretation, stating:

¹ *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*, 2:169.

² *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*, 2:170.

³ Al-Kāshī, *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ* (manuscript), p. 122.

⁴ Al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*, p. 170.

⁵ *Miftāḥ al-Miftāḥ* (manuscript), p. 173.

“As for interpreting the benefit of coordination as the participation of the two elements in the meaning indicated by grammatical inflection, and interpreting acceptability as the existence of a unifying connection, this is not entirely satisfactory, because both interpretations are restricted to only some of the possible cases” (1).

The States of Sentences

Al-Taftazani explains the various states of two sentences with respect to coordination. In *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*, he began with *qa* (disjunction), whereas in *Al-Muḥawwal*, he began with *fasl* arising from complete disjunction (*kamāl al-inqīḍ*), following Al-Qazwini’s arrangement.

The situations require a sentence to be separated from what precedes it. The first occurs when the preceding statement possesses a particular ruling or implication, and the speaker does not intend for the subsequent statement to share in that ruling. In such a case, coordination is omitted. If, before the preceding statement, there exists another statement to which the subsequent statement could validly be coordinated without impediment, then the omission of coordination is precautionary (*iṭṭiyāʿan*), to avoid the mistaken assumption that it is coordinated with the nearest statement, which contains the impediment. This situation is referred to as **quasi-complete disjunction** (*shibh kamāl al-inqīḍ*) and is known as **precautionary disjunction** (*qa iṭṭiyāʿan*). However, if there is no earlier statement free from such an impediment, or if there is one but it too contains an impediment to coordination, then the omission of coordination becomes obligatory.

The second type occurs when the preceding statement implies a question for which the subsequent statement may serve as an answer. The implied question is then treated as though it were explicitly stated, and coordination of the second statement is omitted to emphasize its function as an answer to that question. This second type of disjunction corresponds to what is termed **quasi-complete connection** (*shibh kamāl al-ittiḥād*) (2).

As for the circumstance that calls for substitution, clarification, elucidation, confirmation, and reinforcement—what is termed (**complete connection**)—al-Taftāzānī explained that the condition requiring one sentence to be substituted for a preceding sentence arises when the preceding statement does not fully convey the intended meaning, or appears similar to a statement that is not fully sufficient because of some degree of obscurity. He distinguished the **substitutive sentence** from the **explanatory sentence**, noting that the former differs from the latter in that it does not involve a renewed intention of discourse or any additional concern for the matter at hand; rather, its sole purpose is to remove ambiguity. In this discussion, he was responding to al-Kāshī’s objection that what al-Sakkākī had stated concerning substitution was essentially similar to what he had said regarding clarification and elucidation (3).

Regarding the circumstance that necessitates **confirmation and reinforcement**, al-Taftāzānī explained it as follows: “When the preceding sentence is such that it may give rise to an impression of figurative usage, inadvertence, insufficient comprehensiveness, the emergence of a doubt, or inattentiveness on the part of the listener, or anything similar that requires further reinforcement and consolidation.” In (*al-Muḥawwal*), however, he mentioned only figurative usage and inadvertence (4).

With respect to the circumstance requiring **complete disjunction** between two sentences, al-Taftāzānī added to their difference in being declarative and imperative that the context must not contain anything that would remove this distinction, such as a declarative statement carrying the meaning of a request, or a request carrying the meaning of a declaration. Without this qualification, complete disjunction would not be realized. Thus, what necessitates complete disjunction is difference accompanied by this condition. Furthermore, there must be no relation between the two sentences that would lead the faculty of thought to associate them, whether through reason, supposition, or imagination. In contrast, in both (*al-Muḥawwal*) and (*al-Mukhtaṣar*), he merely referred

¹ Al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*, p. 171.

² See *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*, pp. 191, 193, and 194.

³ See *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*, pp. 198–199; and *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ* by al-Kāshī (manuscript), p. 125.

⁴ *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*, vol. 2, p. 199.

to the two sentences differing verbally as declarative and imperative, or differing in meaning as declarative and imperative, following al-Qazwīnī's wording. He also mentioned the existence of a connecting relation (*jāmi'*) between them without elaborating on its types, discussing this issue elsewhere after completing his treatment of the states of the two sentences. In another passage of (*Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*), he stated that what is meant by *ta'mīn* (implication) is broader than one of the two expressions simply carrying the meaning of the other⁽¹⁾.

Types of the Unifying Relationship Between Two Sentences

Al-Taftazānī presented al-Sakkākī's explanation of the rational, imaginative, and estimative unifying relationships between two sentences, discussing each in detail and distinguishing between them.

The rational unifying relationship (*al-jāmi' al-'aqlī*) is "the existence of unity, similarity, or correlation in the conception of a particular element occurring in the two sentences, whether that element is the subject, the predicate, or one of their qualifying components, such as an attribute, circumstantial qualifier, object, or the like. As for unity, its meaning is self-evident. Similarity is grounded in the participation of distinct individuals in a single essence. Because the intellect is naturally disposed to apprehend universals rather than particulars, it abstracts similar individuals from the accidental features that distinguish them in external existence, thereby overlooking their plurality and apprehending them as a unified conceptual entity. As for correlation, its meaning is that two things are conceived only in relation to one another; thus, when one of them is present in the mind, the absence of the other becomes inconceivable." ⁽²⁾

The estimative unifying relationship (*al-jāmi' al-wahmī*) exists when there is a form of apparent similarity between the conceptions of the subject, predicate, and their qualifications in one sentence and the corresponding conceptions in another. An example is the relationship between the colours white and yellow. Although they are two distinct categories, the estimative faculty presents them as though they were of the same kind, almost as if yellow were simply white with an additional quality. It may also arise through opposition, as between black and white, or through quasi-opposition, as between heaven and earth. In such cases, the estimative faculty treats opposites, or things resembling opposites, as though they were correlatives, since the occurrence of one in the mind naturally calls forth the other. It therefore associates them together in the faculty of thought, just as it does with correlatives.

The imaginative unifying relationship (*al-jāmi' al-khayālī*) exists when the conceptions contained in the two sentences are associated together in the imagination. This association may result from a variety of causes that lead to their coexistence in the mind. Unlike the rational relationship, which is based on a necessary connection, or the estimative relationship, which resembles such necessity, the imaginative relationship involves no inherent or obligatory link. Many images may be associated with one person's imagination, while the same images may not be associated in another's. For example, the images of paper, an inkpot, a pen, and a knife naturally occur together in the imagination of a writer, but not in that of a butcher. ⁽³⁾

The Intermediate State between Complete Connection and Complete Disjunction

In his discussion of the intermediate state between complete connection (*kamāl al-ittiḥād*) and complete disjunction (*kamāl al-inqisā'*), Al-Taftazani notes that Al-Sakkaki "gave precedence to the discussion of a declarative statement (*khābar*) imbued with the meaning of a request (*alab*) over the reverse case, even though the latter falls more directly within the category of declarative discourse, because the former occurs more frequently and involves greater subtlety and complexity" ⁽⁴⁾.

¹ See *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*, vol. 2, pp. 200 and 227; and *al-Muṭawwal*, vol. 2, pp. 279 and 281.

² *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*: 2/203.

³ See: *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*: 2/205, 206, 210, and 211.

⁴ *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*: 2/227.

Al-Taftazani also responded to an objection raised by Al-Mu'adhdhinī in *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*. The latter argued that a declarative statement cannot properly be imbued with the meaning of a request, nor can a request be imbued with the meaning of a declarative statement, since each is inherently opposed to the other. Consequently, one cannot be subsumed within the meaning of the other because of the contradiction between them. Al-Taftazani replied that what is meant by *taḥmīn* (implication or inclusion of meaning) is broader than merely one expression literally assuming the meaning of the other; rather, it may also involve directing the discourse toward an interpretation that presupposes or implies the meaning of the other ⁽¹⁾.

He further addressed Al-Mu'adhdhinī's objection that removing the difference between the two statements and establishing a unifying link between them does not negate complete connection and therefore cannot establish an intermediate state. Al-Taftazani responded that "the discussion is predicated upon the assumption that complete connection is absent" ⁽²⁾.

Al-Taftazani also explained that there are certain rhetorical embellishments (*muḥassināt*) of *wasl* (conjunction) which operate alongside the intermediate relationship between complete connection and complete disjunction. When these embellishments are present, the conjunction becomes rhetorically elegant; when they are absent, the conjunction may remain grammatically valid but is regarded as stylistically deficient. These embellishments were described by Al-Sakkaki in the following terms:

"Know that among the embellishments of conjunction is that the two sentences should correspond to one another, such as both being nominal sentences or both being verbal sentences, and the like. Thus, when the purpose of predication is merely to attribute the predicate to its subject, without intending any additional qualification such as renewal, permanence, or the like, it is necessary to observe this correspondence. Accordingly, one should say: (*Qāma Zaydun, wa qa'ada Amrun*) ('Zayd stood up, and Amr sat down'), or (*Zaydun qā'imun, wa Amrun qā'idun*) ('Zayd is standing, and Amr is sitting') ..." ⁽³⁾.

Al-Taftazani objected to Al-Sakkaki's use of the examples (*Qāma Zaydun, wa qa'ada Amrun*) ("Zayd stood up, and Amr sat down") and (*Zaydun qā'imun, wa Amrun qā'idun*) ("Zayd is standing, and Amr is sitting") in connection with his statement, "without intending any additional qualification such as renewal or permanence." Al-Taftazani argued that the first example necessarily conveys the notion of renewal or occurrence (*tajaddud*). In support of this view, he cited the opinion of Shaykh 'Abd al-Qahir, according to whom, if the purpose of predication is merely absolute affirmation, it should be expressed by means of a nominal construction, whereas if the intention is to indicate that the affirmation is associated with a particular time, it should be expressed through a verbal construction ⁽⁴⁾.

Accordingly, Al-Taftazani maintained that predication intended solely to establish a relationship between the predicate and the subject, without any consideration of renewal or permanence, and merely for the sake of achieving correspondence between the two sentences, does not constitute eloquent discourse. Consequently, he questioned how such correspondence could be regarded as one of the embellishments of *wasl* (conjunction), particularly considering the view that eloquence is fundamentally grounded in distinguishing *fasl* (disjunction) from *wasl*.

Conclusion and Findings

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that al-Taftazānī made several important contributions to the study of disjunction and coordination in *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*. These contributions are reflected in his clarification of the

¹ See: *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ* by al-Mu'adhdhinī (manuscript): 275, and *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*: 2/227.

² *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*: 2/228; see also *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ* by al-Mu'adhdhinī (manuscript): 275.

³ *Miftāḥ al-'Ulūm*, p. 271; see also *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*, vol. 2, p. 280.

⁴ See *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*, vol. 2, p. 281; see also *Dalā'il al-Ijāz*, p. 174.

significance of disjunction and coordination and in his explanation of why scholars of *Ma' ānī* considered them the foundation of eloquence. He further explained that the principles governing disjunction and coordination revolve around three categories: unity and connection (complete connection), distinction and separation (complete separation), and an intermediate position between the two. In contrast, in *Al-Mu'awwal*, he expanded these into six categories.

Al-Taftazānī also identified the fundamental principles of coordination as: the appropriate position for coordination, its rhetorical benefit, and the reason for its acceptance in the judgment of eloquent speakers. In addition, he responded to the interpretations of several commentators, including al-Shīrāzī, regarding these principles.

Among his contributions was the expansion of the condition requiring confirmation and reinforcement. He maintained that the preceding sentence may give rise to the impression of figurative usage, inadvertence, insufficient comprehensiveness, the emergence of doubt, inattentiveness on the part of the listener, or similar considerations that necessitate further confirmation and reinforcement. By contrast, in *Al-Mu'awwal* he mentioned only figurative usage and inadvertence.

In his discussion of the condition requiring complete separation between two sentences, he added that the context must not contain anything capable of removing the difference between them, such as a declarative statement carrying the meaning of a request, or vice versa. Elsewhere in *Sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*, he further explained that inclusion (*taḥmīn*) is broader than merely one expression conveying the meaning of another. In contrast, both *Al-Mu'awwal* and *Al-Mukhtaṣar* limit the discussion to the difference between the two sentences as declarative and non-declarative, either in wording or in meaning.

Finally, al-Taftazānī engaged critically with several commentators on various issues relating to disjunction and coordination, among them al-Kāshī, al-Shīrāzī, and al-Mu' adhdhinī.

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