

Information, Certainty, and Identity: Toward a Phenomenology of Information Beyond the Phenomenology of Time

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Abstract: The research contributes to a groundbreaking re-articulation of the Philosophy of Information by defining it as a phenomenology of information, in both its most basic meaning of phenomenology of certainty and phenomenology of identity. It is said that the final condition of possibility of conscious experience is certainty, which is understood in terms of reflexive identity and informational coincidence, based upon the Informational Singularity of Self-Consciousness (ISS), and the Principle of Direct Relation (PDR). Unlike prevailing conceptions that focus on uncertainty, the analysis reveals that certainty has an inherent informational value, stabilizes phenomena, and forms the basis of cognition, meaning and self consciousness. The research also demonstrates that this phenomenology of information generalises the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness of Husserl: temporality structures, (i.e. retention, protention, the living present), assume a previous stratum of informational identity. The correspondence between certainty and time is structurally comparable to the correspondence between predicate logic and propositional logic; certainty gives the richer structural base of assertion of time. Combining phenomenological, semantic and quantitative approaches, the framework provides a comprehensive solution having a philosophical implication to the philosophy of mind, logic and information. It offers new conceptual instruments into dealing with classical philosophical issues on identity, analyticity, and informational basis of experience..

Keywords: Philosophy of Information · Certainty · Identity · Phenomenology · Self-Consciousness · Time-Consciousness · Informational Structure

Introduction

The Philosophy of Information has grown in two major directions. The quantitative theories, which started in information theory, describe the information in the form of reduction of uncertainty, probability and entropy (Andersen & Grush, 2009; Atkins, 2024). The semantic and epistemic approaches, in their turn, focus on meaning, truth, and knowledge, and in most cases, they regard information as meaningful, well-formed data (Barwise & Seligman, 1997; Brentano, 2012). Although they differ, these traditions meet on a common assumption: information is valuable, first of all, insofar as it eliminates the indeterminacy. Certainty in this context is normally seen as being informationally trivial, epistemically redundant or just psychological. What is still mostly unanalyzed is the phenomenological determination of information as such, how is information given, fixed and experienced in the first-person view and what are the structural conditions of such givenness at all (Brentano, 2012; Bruni, 2025; Ciocan, 2025).

Such limitation is also present in phenomenology. Ever since Husserl wrote on the topic of internal time-consciousness, phenomenological inquiry has been inclined to take temporal articulation as the default source of experience. Retention, primal impression and protention are made to be the minimal structure through which experience may seem to be continuous, unified and meaningful (Dretske, 1981). This time structure has been very essential in the study of dynamics of experience but has also promoted the perception that time-consciousness is the most profound phenomenological situation. Consequently, the fact that time itself assumes something deeper at the level of experienced structure has not been adequately pursued (Emami & Hunt, 2025; Findlay, 1975; Fresco & Michael, 2016).

It is the convergence of both traditions on a methodological asymmetry that uncertainty takes precedence in theorizing information and that time is taken precedence in phenomenology (Fresco & Michael, 2016; Haj-Bolouri, 2025; Huang, 2025). This research contests either of these two assumptions by providing a groundbreaking reformulation of the Philosophy of Information as phenomenology of information that is construed in the most basic way as a phenomenology of certainty (Haj-Bolouri, 2025; Huang, 2025; Husserl, 2012). The developed certainty is not an epistemic attitude to propositions, the subjective sense of confidence, or the information vacuum. It is rather a structure of information based on identity and reflexive coincidence the coincidence of representation and represented, a system with itself (Husserl, 2012, 2019; Jansen & van der Steen, 2025; Jaued, 2025).

It is on this basis that certainty has informational value. It solidifies the identity, fixes the meaning, and allows distinguishing, negating, and comparing. Without certainty, there could be no phenomenon which should be able to preserve its identity in the face of a variation, no content, which should be determinately given, and no experience, which should present itself as experience at all (Kelly, 2025). Even the notions of uncertainty, contrast and informational difference assume the existence of a background of certainty on which the variation may take place. Information is not however antithetical to certainty, but is one of its most basic manifestations.

This rethinking has momentous consequences to phenomenology. Experience, as it is to be experienced, must be certain, unless there is to be something it is like to a subject. This assurance is not obtained by inference, comparison or even synthesis of time, but is prior to them as such. The temporal structures like succession, retention and protention are articulations of experience, that is, they do not indicate why experience may occur in the first place (Kelly, 2025; Kolmogorov, 1965). Retention assumes fixation, continuity assumes identity and temporal differentiation assumes that something which is the same in change. Though both certainty and time are mutually implicated in the experience of living, their relationship is a relationship of asymmetry in the sense that time expresses experience, and certainty expresses its possibility.

This imbalance is especially acute in the situation of self-consciousness. In its simplest form, self-consciousness is non-inferential, non-contrastive and non-relational, non-dual, reflexive (Liu, 2022; McNerney, 1988). The phenomenological identities like I am I or I exist are not only analytic truths, but they are constitutive informational structures which are maximally certain. In these structures, unity, stability, and coherence through temporal change are established and allow the subject to be the same subject, but changing. Self-consciousness is information singularity, then, a point of maximum identity and certainty on the basis of which experience in the temporal way arises.

The connection between certainty and time can be explained with the help of an analogy involving formal logic. Similar to the way that predicate logic demonstrates a deeper structure level that underlies propositional logic, data provided by the phenomenology of certainty demonstrates a grounding structure of information, which underlies the phenomenology of time. Such analogy does not bring phenomenological experience down to the level of formal systems, but it is used to shed light on relationships of structure dominance and reliance (McNerney, 1988; Merlan, 1947; Missel et al., 2025; Nagel, 1974). Time-consciousness is not an obsolete, but no longer the final basis.

This research is meant to state a phenomenology of information based on certainty as informational identity, and demonstrate that this framework offers a more fundamental explanation of phenomenality than time-consciousness does. It aims at uniting phenomenological analysis with conceptual resources of the philosophy of information and logic so as to explicate the structural conditions of possibility of experience and of meaning and of the self-consciousness. This method is important in that it has the ability to bring together quantitative, semantic and phenomenological conceptions of information and provide a systematic re-consideration of the roots of phenomenology itself. The research offers new conceptual resources to solve classical problems about identity, analyticity, and conscious experience, by considering the absence of certainty as informational ground and not informational absence.

Methods

Phenomenological Analysis and Eidetic Description

This analytical technique involves the detailed description of a phenomenon or situation by examining its characteristics, meanings, and interpretation. This method of analysis is used to describe a situation or phenomenon in great detail by addressing its properties, meanings, and interpretation. This research mainly follows the Husserlian tradition of classical phenomenology analysis as the main methodological framework. The exploration process is not meant to define actual empirical mental states, psychological processes, or subjective feelings per se, but to define the structural conditions of the nature of conscious experience that are invariably present. Based on this, the analysis will be carried out using eidetic description in which the analysis will look at what has to be the case so that phenomena can occur, regardless of contingent empirical variation.

At the core of this strategy lies focus on first-person givenness, identity and fixation of experience. Certainty is considered phenomenologically as no longer a belief or attitude to propositions, but a structural character of appearance as such. The phenomenological reduction is applied in a methodological respect to the extent that empirical, causal and naturalistic reasons are bracketed to concentrate on conditions of appearance and self-givenness. This is given the statements in this framework which relate to phenomenological necessity and not to empirical generality.

According to this approach, it is free of analysis being partisan to the psychological theories, neuroscientific models, or naturalistic reductions, yet it maintains rigor in terms of structural necessity and descriptive adequacy. It is not intended to provide an explanation of how experience comes about causally, but to provide an understanding of what is meant by experience being a possibility in the first place. **Table 1** shows the foundational levels of phenomenological certainty and their roles in experience

Table 1. Foundational Levels of Phenomenological Certainty and Their Roles in Experience

Level of Analysis	Object of Analysis	Mode of Certainty	Methodological Character	Function in the Argument
Phenomenological Level	Conditions of appearance and first-person givenness	Certainty of appearance (self-givenness, non-relational)	Eidetic, non-empirical, descriptive	Establishes the condition of possibility of phenomenality as such
Informational Level	Identity, fixation, and reflexive coincidence	Certainty as informational identity	Structural–conceptual, non-reductive	Grounds unity, stability, and determinacy of experience

Conceptual and Structural Analysis.

Phenomenological analysis is supplemented by conceptual and structural analysis based on philosophy of information, logic and metaphysics. Some of the most important concepts like information, certainty, identity, reflexivity, and self-consciousness are explored on the structural level, with the particular emphasis on the dependence and precedence relations. The analysis does not present any stipulative definitions, but illuminates the way these concepts work within one explanatory framework.

This is a conceptual work in which it is differentiated between various senses of identity (logical, phenomenological, and informational) and various senses of certainty (epistemic, psychological, and phenomenological). The explicit formulation of structural asymmetries is done in terms of arguments about presupposition and grounding, as in the argument that articulation of time assumes identity, and that identity assumes certainty. These associations are not deduced as such, but are argued out of logical

necessity.

Similes to formal logic, e.g. the correspondence between predicate logic and propositional logic, are used as heuristic tools to inform us about structural depth levels. These analogies are not meant to reduce phenomenological phenomena to formal systems, but they are used to explain that there is an explanatory priority and structural dependence in the argument.

Integrative Use of Information Theory

This research takes an integrative yet non-reductive position over and against quantitative and semantic information theories. Both classical descriptions of information as reduction in uncertainty, probability or entropy and semantic theories of information (which focus on meaning and reference) are considered formally rigorous but incomplete when viewed as being the foundational descriptions of information. However, these theories are not dismissed, but are placed in the context of a wider phenomenology.

The structural constraints that are applied by information-theoretic concepts to describe various levels of informational organization are not empirical explanans of phenomenological experience. No mathematical formalism is taken, no claims are made to the measurement or computation of information of cognitive systems. In its place, the analysis dwells on the conceptual role of certainty as informational identity, and also on its connection with defined informational principles.

The integrative position enables this research to mediate between phenomenology and modern philosophy of information without adopting a naturalized or empirically reductionist approach. The outcome is the development of a paradigm where quantitative, semantic, and phenomenological aspects of information are perceived as complementary, as opposed to conflicting.

Scope, Limitations, and Philosophical Standards.

The research has a non-empirical and non-naturalistic methodological scope. Its objective is not to compare competing scientific theories of cognition, or to come up with testable hypotheses regarding neural or computational mechanisms. Its assertions are philosophical in nature and are judged based on the criteria of conceptual intelligibility, internal consistency and explanatory sufficiency.

Meanwhile, the analysis is restricted by the prerequisite of phenomenological plausibility: the structures presented must be related to familiar characteristics of experience in their turn. Where feasible, new claims are anchored in an existing tradition by the way of classical phenomenological differences. The framework is empirically or formally open to future extension, but the extensions are out of scope of the current investigation.

Results

The Results section summarizes the core discoveries and conceptual contributions. **Table 2** shows main findings related to certainty, self-consciousness, and the structure of experience

Table 2. Main Findings: Certainty, Self-Consciousness, and the Structure of Experience

Finding	Description	Level of Analysis	Conceptual Implication	Relation to Time
Certainty as Informational Identity	Certainty is an informational structure where representation coincides with what is represented; it is not the absence of information but a fundamental	Informational	Provides the foundational layer for all subsequent cognition and experience; ensures stability and coherence of phenomena.	Temporal articulation presupposes this certainty; identity precedes temporal continuity.

Information, Certainty, and Identity: Toward a
Phenomenology of Information Beyond the
Phenomenology of Time

	mode of constitution.			
Principle of Direct Relation (PDR)	Information is directly proportional to certainty, complementing classical uncertainty-based measures.	Informational	Highlights the constitutive role of certainty; shows that informational value derives from identity, fixation, and reflexivity.	Enables temporal and relational structures to be intelligible and stable.
Informational Singularity of Self-Consciousness (ISS)	Self-consciousness arises from a singular informational structure characterized by maximal certainty and reflexive identity.	Informational & Phenomenological	Stabilizes the self as a coherent system; grounds intentionality and cognition; unifies experience over time.	Temporal succession is possible because the self maintains identity and coherence.
Subsumption of Time by Certainty	Temporal structures (retention, protention, living present) are derivative and dependent on certainty.	Phenomenological	Shows that phenomenological time is contingent upon prior certainty; clarifies structural asymmetry between time and identity.	Certainty provides the condition for temporal experience to be intelligible.
Certainty of Experience	Phenomenality requires absolute, intrinsic certainty; the "certainty of experience" is prior to temporal or relational articulation.	Phenomenological	Distinguishes between the experience of certainty and the certainty of experience; grounds the possibility of phenomenality itself.	All temporal and relational experience is contingent upon this foundational certainty.

Certainty as Informational Identity

Certainty in philosophy and cognitive science is typically considered as an epistemic attitude to propositions, synonymous to belief, justification and truth, or has a subjective meaning, as a sense of confidence or assurance (Neukart, 2025). With these structures, certainty is secondary, derivative (or even trivial): it is not part of the structure of experience but rather attends on knowledge or cognition. The current paradigm, in its turn, redefines certainty as an informational order, a basic mode of constitution that stands behind all phenomena of experience and cognition (Rossi, 2025). In particular, the coincidence of the representation and the represented, that is, on a larger scale, the identity of a system with itself in a reflexive manner is certainty (Nagel, 1974; Neukart, 2025; Parlar-Yazıcı et al., 2025). In this respect, being sure does not mean lack of information, but is a precondition of the information and intelligibility possibility. In the absence of a surety there is no constant referent, no established identity, and no specific content that can be caught and digested.

Coupled with the classical view of information as a quantifier of uncertainty reduction, a view supplied in the information theory of Shannon, and elaborated in semantic and epistemic theories, is a complementary and more fundamental aspect, namely the information of certainty (Parlar-Yazıcı et al., 2025; Rossi, 2025; Saitta, 2025; Sequoiah-Grayson & Floridi, 2005). Whereas traditional methods lay stress on the difference, change or indeterminacy as the origin of information, the informational approach advanced in this research lays stress on stability, identity, and fixation. Certainty is informative, in that it gives the formal ground upon which distinction, negations, contrasts, and comparisons can be made (Su, 2025). It entails determinacy of identity of phenomena and makes meaning determinate, persistent and intelligible through time. This is to say, that the presence of certainty does not simply come with information, but is the precondition of information being there and being structured in the first place.

This fact is reflected in the Principle of Direct Relation (PDR) where the informational content of a system is proportional to the degree of certainty which it is based on. The classical principle of inverse relation which is eminent in information theory emphasizes the informational role of uncertainty and the PDR points to the constitutive role of certainty (Sequoiah-Grayson & Floridi, 2005; Su, 2025; Watts, 2025; Zhang, 2025). This meaning of certainty: it is a primary informational identity: it equips systems with stability, coherence, and self-reflexivity, enabling systems to have continuity and intelligibility. By presupposing certainty in the form of a structural principle, but not a derivative feature, the current approach brings into view an informational layer that precedes and guarantees cognition, meaning, and experience itself.

The Singularity of Informational Self-Consciousness

The idea of the Informational Singularity of Self-Consciousness (ISS) expresses the argument that self-consciousness is based on a single, ground-level informational structure (Rossi, 2025). This is the most fundamental layer, which is defined by maximum certainty and reflexive identity, on which all the further cognition, experience, and intentionality is founded. At this level, self-consciousness is not an inferential, contrastive, nor relational in normal sense. Rather, it is reflexive, non-dual: the self is in a direct and non-mediated coincidence with itself, and it is a basic point of coherence and stability (Su, 2025). Paradigmatic of this singularity are expressions like I am I, I am myself or I exist. They are not analytical truths or linguistic tautologies but statements of phenomenological identities which constitute the self. They express the ability of the self to preserve the continuity in the face of temporal and experience change. At this degree, certainty is not an epistemic judgment, it is an informational property: it constitutes an identity, fixes the self, gives the experience the coherence of experience through time. The ISS therefore offers the informational centrality on which the self has itself, and which does not divide in the plurality of experience which it has (Zhang, 2025).

Under this system, certainty takes up a wider structural position. It is order against indeterminacy and identity against entropy, which allows the system to counteract fragmentation and structural integrity (Rossi, 2025). Their informational counterparts are the ISS, symmetry, internal coherence and circularity: the self is a reflexive system, which harbors itself as an invariant and therefore, determines the circumstances in which the temporal, relational, and propositional forms of experience can arise. On absence of this singularity, experience would not be stable, and cognition would not be systematic.

The phenomenology and information theory also have a bridge, the ISS. Although the traditional explanations put more focus on uncertainty, differentiation or relational structure, the ISS pretends certainty as structurally dominant, revealing reflexive identity not as derivative but as constitutive (Sequoiah-Grayson & Floridi, 2005). In doing that, it sheds light on the under which circumstances all the higher-order cognitive and experiential structures, including memory, attention, self-reference, and temporal consciousness can be organized. This sense of self-consciousness is informational and phenomenological, based upon a unique certainty which is constitutive, stabilizing and unifying.

From Time to Certainty: Subsuming Husserlian Phenomenology

The studies of time-consciousness within are considered to have been ground breaking in the field of phenomenology as conducted by Edmund Husserl. The minimal structure by which

consciousness is temporally articulated is the retention, protention and the living (Jaued, 2025; Kelly, 2025; Kolmogorov, 1965). These categories of time offer an insight into how experiences follow each other, how continuity is achieved and how the self perceives the continuum of a coherent and extended world. Husserl has a framework that is still essential in the comprehension of the temporal organization of experience, but assumed implicitly is the stability of what is experienced (Huang, 2025). Temporal flow assumes that there is continuity of identity, fixation of contents and coherence of phenomena across sequential moments. Temporal articulation, in other words, though both a requirement of the organization of experience, is not adequate to explain the possibility of experience itself.

According to the current structure, the more underlying layer is informational certainty. The continuity of time assumes identity; the fixation of things assumes retention; the stability of things assumes duration (Ishola et al., 2023; Husserl, 2012). The temporal order of experience would not make sense without some structure of grounding which is certainty. Certainty is therefore a precondition as well as an enabling condition: it permits the temporal structures to be intelligently actualized as well as ensuring the permanence of experiential content (Emami & Hunt, 2025; Findlay, 1975). Even though certainty and temporal experience are mutually implicative in that neither can exist without the other, the relationship that exists between the two is structurally asymmetrical. Whereas time explains the development of experience, certainty explains why anything can be in the first place present as an experience.

Such an asymmetry can be explained by an analogy with logic. Phenomenology of certainty just as predicate logic expresses a more structural level that makes propositional logic possible, specifies the underlying layer that supports the temporal articulation (Fresco & Michael, 2016; Ishola & Sun, 2023). Temporal consciousness explains how the experiences are arranged and associated to each other, yet, the phenomenology of certainty explains why the experiences can be given with absolute certainties, united and consistent. In this respect time-consciousness of Husserl is structurally subordinated to the larger context of informational identity: it relies on it, is based on it, the assurance that is itself real in the form of phenomenality (Bruni, 2025; Ciocan, 2025; Dretske, 1981; Emami & Hunt, 2025).

This view offers a unifying explanation of experience by foregrounding some certainty before temporal structuring. The features of time are still necessary, and they are characterized by the relational and extended aspects of cognition, though their intelligibility is determined by the informational identities that presuppose fixation and stability, as well as by reflexive self-coherence (Findlay, 1975). Time is expressed in the form of certainty; certainty is the state of the possibility of time.

The Certainty of Appearance and the Phenomenological Conditions of Experience

One of the main arguments of this framework is that phenomenological certainty is a necessary requirement in the very existence of experience, regardless of the way the experience is modeled in time (Brentano, 2012; Bruni, 2025). The conception of experience may be atomistic, as in the case of the cinematic and Newtonian snapshot of a consciousness, or it may be extended, with its emphasis on duration, succession, retention, and protention, but the fact that it will appear is the bottom line. It is only with the support of a layer of earlier informational identity that provides stability, coherence, and intelligibility in the sequence of experiences that temporal articulation can produce phenomenality.

Phenomenological experience of temporality is inherently relational: past, present and future are established by contrast, differentiation and mutual reference. Such relationality however assumes something not relational (Barwise & Seligman, 1997; Brentano, 2012; Bruni, 2025; Habeeb et al., 2025). There must be certainty that supports appearance and that is absolute and not relative. In case of contingency or gradation of certainty, no dimension of experience could have determinate phenomenological character. This non-derivative certainty that is absolute is what enables the temporal structures to become coherent and intelligible phenomena.

Husserl supports this argument although he denies atomistic or cinematic representations of time, he maintains a three-fold framework; retention, primal impression and protention, which must have a determinate phenomenological mark. The presence of these structures assumes total certainties, despite the fact that their composition is still relational and extended (Fresco & Michael, 2016; Haj-

Bolouri, 2025; Huang, 2025; Sherif et al., 2025; Momani et al., 2025; Othman et al., 2025). This differentiation of the series of experiences and the experience of succession by Franz Brentano further explains the need to have certainty in the background: the series of isolated experiences is not a temporal consciousness whereas the temporally extended phenomenological structure demands a unified, certifying informational core.

More importantly, what is not being questioned by it is the subjective experience of certainty, but the certainty of experience. Phenomenality the something it is like of the subject experiencing it must involve appearances being fixed, coherent and intelligible. Lacking this certainty all experience would manifest itself in a way, and temporal, relational, or extended relations would have no phenomenological existence (Husserl, 2019; Jansen & van der Steen, 2025; Jaued, 2025). The phenomenology of time, thus, expresses itself in the manner of experience happening, whereas the phenomenology of certainty expresses the fact of experience happening at all. It is based on this asymmetry that subsumption is the thesis, and that temporal consciousness is based on the more basic informational and phenomenological identity of certainty.

Discussion

The analysis discussion shows that certainty, which is understood as informational identity, is the base layer of phenomenological experience. Through its conceptualization of certainty as intrinsic, absolute and non-relational, the framework contradicts both phenomenology and traditional accounts of information philosophy. Unlike Husserl, who considered the temporal structures as being the retention, protention and the living present as the final state of experience, the current analysis places the certainty in the logical and structural precedence (Kolmogorov, 1965; Ishola, 2025). Time explains the way experience takes place, whereas some certitude explains why experience is even possible. This difference throws light upon a more radical structural imbalance: the consciousness of time is dependent, and this depends on the availability of a reflexive, self-identical informational center.

The Informational Singularity of Self-Consciousness (ISS) is one example of such a fundamental role. The highest degree of certitude and reflexivity makes the self a stable coherent structure, which facilitates further cognition, memory and intentionality. Without this singularity, time and relational forms of experience would have no coherence and intelligibility (Fresco & Michael, 2016). Equally, the Principle of Direct Relation (PDR) formalizes the constitutive role of certainty in informational terms, and identifies such a role as the role of informational content not as a result of uncertainty reduction, but also of identity and fixation.

It is a framework that holds quantitative, semantic and phenomenological views on information together to expose a hitherto overlooked dimension of certainty as structurally informative. It gives us a unified explanation regarding interdependence of time, self-consciousness and information (Huang, 2025). Moreover, it deals with classical philosophical dilemmas of identity, analyticity, and phenomenal circumstances conditions. By making certainty precede temporality, relationality, and cognition, the analysis clarifies the ambiguity concerning the grounding of experience, as well as, the conceptual preconditions of any coherent phenomenology.

Lastly, the results indicate an enlargement of epistemological wisdom: things become intelligible first before they become articulate. Similarly to how propositional logic is based on predicate logic, certainty is the basis of both temporal and relational structure and forms a hierarchical basis of comprehending both consciousness and information systems. This observation not only has philosophical of mind and phenomenological implications, but also formal theories of information and computational models of self-conscious systems.

Implications

The redefinition of certainty as fundamental has a number of implications. To begin with, it alters the purpose of the information theory where the subject is not the reduction of uncertainty but the identity and reflexive stabilization of information, implying that it is not a primary goal of information, rather, structural fixation and coherence generate the informational value. Secondly, it refutes the idea

that time-consciousness is the final ground in phenomenology demonstrating that temporal structures take derivatives of earlier certitude. Third, in philosophy of mind, the framework presents a principled account of self-consciousness, which brings together retention, unity and reflexivity in one information structure.

Computationally and cognitively, this view can be used practically. People who are simulating the conditions of consciousness or self-reference cannot encode uncertain information as they need to encode consistent informational cores. The framework also offers novel instruments of conducting analysis of classical philosophical issues, such as the nature of analyticity, the circumstances of experiential identity and the foundations of intentionality. It provides a conceptual point of departure which unites diverse perspectives on mind, cognition and knowledge, by predetermining as structurally precedent the situation of cross-disciplinary dialogue between phenomenology, logic and information theory.

Future Directions

The role of certainty as a basis of research can have several directions in future research. To begin with, quantitative evidence of constitutive role of certainty could be offered by first formalizing the Principle of Direct Relation (PDR) in terms of information-theoretic or logical models. This kind of formalization can bring out quantifiable characteristics of informational identity that cut across phenomenology and computational strategies. Second, one may discuss the Informational Singularity of Self-Consciousness (ISS) in terms of neuroscience and cognitive science, discussing the manner in which reflexive informational cores are instantiated in neural or cognitive structures without being reduced to physical processes.

Third, cross-disciplinary applications would look at the information of certainty structures that inform artificial intelligence and autonomous systems especially in self-maintenance, stability, and coherence in the adaptive agents (Mosleh et al., 2025; Zedan et al., 2025). Fourth, comparative phenomenological research would be done to understand whether alternative temporal or cultural models of experience assume the same fundamental certitude, which may be generalized to non-Western or alternative paradigms of consciousness. Lastly, the synthesis of certainty and formal logic, semantics, and information theory suggests that epistemology, phenomenology, and cognitive modeling should be posed to theory synthesis, where there is fertile ground both to conceptual and empirical research.

Conclusion

As has been discussed in this research, certainty, which is informational identity, is the final state of possibility of conscious experience, temporal articulation, and self-consciousness. It has demonstrated the derivativeness of temporal structures, relationality and epistemic measures as conceptualized as a phenomenology of certainty as the Philosophy of Information. An example of how the self is held constant and stabilized with the most certainty and maximum reflexivity is found in the Informational Singularity of Self-Consciousness which offers a sense of coherence and unity to the experience of time. The Principle of Direct Relation institutionalizes the constitutive informational necessity of certainty which demonstrates a structural hierarchy where time, cognition and relationality are conditional upon identity.

The analysis combines the method of phenomenology, logic and information, providing a coherent framework of knowing the structure of experience and what it requires to be intelligible. It alters philosophical and scientific view of information, self-consciousness and temporality by placing emphasis on certainty rather than on uncertainty. The framework also offers a basis to cross-disciplinary studies, relating phenomenology, philosophy of mind, logic and computational modeling. Finally, the treatment of certainty as structurally prior elucidates the possibility as well as coherence of experience giving one a conceptual framework to investigate identity, analyticity and informational structure of consciousness itself.

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Information, Certainty, and Identity: Toward a
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