EPISTEMIC CERTAINTY AND THE LIMITS OF INFORMATIONAL KNOWLEDGE: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

Abstract

Epistemic certainty has long been regarded as a central objective of philosophical inquiry, yet the expansion of digital information and artificial intelligence has renewed questions about whether absolute certainty is attainable. This paper examines the relationship between epistemic certainty and informational knowledge by integrating classical epistemology with contemporary theories of information and artificial intelligence. The manuscript argues that no finite informational agent can attain absolute certainty due to finitude, perspectivity, social mediation, and epistemic recursion, while clarifying its novel contribution beyond existing theories of epistemic limitations. Drawing upon the traditions of foundationalism, scepticism, fallibilism, and the epistemology of information, the study argues that these limitations are not temporary obstacles but intrinsic characteristics of finite cognitive systems. Rather than treating uncertainty as a weakness, the paper proposes that certainty should be understood as a regulative ideal that guides rational inquiry, critical evaluation, and continuous revision of beliefs. The analysis further explores the implications of this framework for artificial epistemic agents, particularly large language models, highlighting the importance of transparency, accountability, and epistemic responsibility in AI design and deployment. The paper concludes that reliable knowledge is best achieved through fallibilist inquiry, where intellectual humility and ongoing critical assessment replace the unattainable pursuit of infallible certainty.