DYNAMICS AND PATTERNS OF COMPULSORY EARLY MILITARY RETIREMENT AS A COUP-PROOFING STRATEGY IN NIGERIA

Abstract

This study investigates the strategic use of compulsory early military retirement as a mechanism of coup-proofing and civilian control in post-1999 Nigeria. Drawing on the principal-agent theory, the research explores how successive civilian administrations have employed targeted retirements to manage loyalty, mitigate coup threats, and consolidate regime security. Through a qualitative, case-oriented methodology and triangulation of official data, media reports, and scholarly literature, the study identifies over 400 senior officers who were retired under contentious or politically charged circumstances. Findings reveal that early retirements are often concentrated during political transitions and serve overlapping functions: weakening independent military networks, enabling ethnic and regional balancing, and reinforcing patronage structures. Comparative insights from Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan further contextualize Nigeria’s civil-military dynamics.