Granting Legal Personality to Artificial Intelligence between Support and Objection

Abstract

During recent decades, the world has witnessed remarkable development in the field of artificial intelligence, as intelligent systems have become capable of performing tasks that were once the exclusive preserve of human beings, such as “making decisions, devising solutions, and managing complex operations independently”. This scientific and technical progress has raised profound legal questions concerning the status of artificial intelligence within the legal system, particularly with regard to its liability for acts and decisions taken without direct human intervention. Among the most prominent issues raised in this context is the question of granting legal personality to artificial intelligence; that is, recognising it as a legal “person” enjoying rights and bearing obligations, similar to natural or juridical persons. Legal scholarship has divided between a supporting view, which regards this as necessary in order to keep pace with technological development and ensure that intelligent entities are held accountable for their acts, and an opposing view, which considers that granting legal personality to a non-human entity constitutes a breach of the fundamental concepts of law and an encroachment upon human responsibility for creating these tools.