U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward the Soviet Union, 1949–1952

Abstract

This study examines the formulation and implementation of United States policy in response to the emerging Soviet nuclear threat between 1949 and 1952. It seeks to uncover the mechanisms of American decision-making and the role of official institutions and their contributions by tracing the historical development of the Soviet nuclear program and the security threat it posed to the United States. Drawing on a range of primary sources, including declassified government documents and official policy statements, the study analyzes the political, military, and diplomatic considerations that shaped early Cold War nuclear strategy. It further highlights the interaction between threat perception, technological developments, and policy innovation, demonstrating how the United States sought to maintain strategic superiority and deter Soviet aggression. By situating early nuclear policy within the broader framework of international relations theory, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of the foundations of American Cold War strategy and its enduring implications for contemporary nuclear deterrence policy. This study finds that U.S. nonproliferation policy reflected a broader shift in American strategic thinking from bilateral nuclear rivalry toward managing a multilateral nuclear order. Accordingly, U.S. threat perceptions expanded beyond the Soviet Union to include the destabilizing risks of nuclear proliferation and its implications for deterrence and systemic stability.