Judicial Power and Constitutional Accountability in India: Rights Protection, Institutional Balance and the Limits of Judicial Intervention, 2014–2024

Abstract

This article focuses on the Indian judiciary from 2014 to 2024, specifically on the extent to which judicial action improved constitutional rights and accountability mechanisms without tipping the institutional balance among the legislature, executive and judiciary. The study is based on doctrinal, qualitative, and quantitative data collected from 120 respondents. It adopts a mixed-method that includes an examination of the Supreme Court rulings, constitutional and scholarly literature, as well as perception data from 120 respondents, the majority of whom are associated with judiciary and academia. The study showcases that the judiciary performs well in terms of protecting rights and ensuring constitutional governance. For instance, 76.09% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that judicial review increased legislative accountability, 73.91% agreed or strongly agreed that the judiciary maintains an effective check on the Executive, 78.27% agreed or strongly agreed that judicial review strengthened the separation of powers, and 73.91% agreed or strongly agreed that the judiciary struck a balance between activism and restraint. At the same time, 45.65% reported that the court was sometimes involved in policies other than constitutional interpretation, while 26.09% have shown neutral stance regarding the same. What mattered was that the judiciary was active in some cases and respectful in others. The study, thus presents a paradox between accountability and independence and advocates for principled judicial intervention, clearer institutional boundaries, increased transparency in judicial appointments, improved case management and regulated technological modernization